The police officers, on the facts of this case, discharged the duty which rested upon them to give notice before forcing entry. Accordingly they are culpable for Corey Peeace’s cold-blooded killing. The subsequent cover-up was even yet more heinous.
The search for justice for Corey continues::
Since R. v. Landry & Eccles v. Bourque ought to be the applicable pillars to the Corey Peeace litigation / investigation – justice, it seems in Alberta is lost.
“If the criteria of s. 450(1) of the Criminal Code and the standards enunciated in Eccles v. Bourque are met, a police officer can make an arrest on private premises without a warrant in the
execution of his duty for the purposes of s. 450(1)(a).” R. v. Landry,  1 SCR 145
“Section 450(1) of the Criminal Code does not alter the common law principles with respect to spatial limits on arrest without a warrant and the silence of the Code requires that the common
law apply. Eccles v. Bourque was not a case restricted to situations where a warrant, albeit unendorsed, existed, but rather dealt with the power of the police to arrest without warrant in private premises. The present case falls to be decided by application of Eccles v. Bourque, just as Eccles v. Bourque, on the view of the Court at that time, fell within the four corners of the old common law authorities. The policy underlying the cases, both older and more recent, is clear and compelling: there should be no place which gives an offender sanctuary from arrest. Although the Criminal Code provides for warrants for the search of things, it does not provide for the search of persons.
Absent the power of police to arrest on private premises, a criminal offender might therefore find complete and permanent protection from the law in a private home.
Parliament took for granted the common law power of forcible entry to effect an arrest. While the courts can decline to confer new common law powers intruding on civil liberties–and this Court has been cautious in conferring those powers–it is quite another thing for the Court to abrogate powers recognized by the courts, particularly when those powers descend from entrenched authorities of the 17th century.
LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF PERSON.
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
SEARCH OR SEIZURE.
8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
The right of entry to search for an offender is not unrestricted. This Court held in Eccles v. Bourque that entry could only be made against the will of a householder if: (1) there were reasonable and probable grounds for the belief that the person sought was within the premises, and (2) if proper announcement was made prior to entry. Proper announcement would ordinarily entail the police
giving (i) notice of presence, (ii) notice of authority by identifying themselves as police officers, and (iii) notice of purpose by stating lawful reasons for entry.
These requirements minimize the invasiveness of arrest in a dwelling and permit the offender to maintain his dignity and privacy by walking to the doorway and surrendering himself.
There is good reason to stand by the common law authorities in lieu of adopting a new rule requiring the police to obtain an arrest warrant in order to make an arrest in residential
premises. If a police officer is forced to obtain an arrest warrant before entering a residence, he will first have to attempt to obtain the name of the offender from the neighbours. In many cases the
neighbours will be unable to supply this information. Even if he obtains the offender’s name, the police officer will then have to seek a justice of the peace to execute a warrant. Valuable time–and
probably the offender–will be lost.
The specific concerns relating to arrests within a dwelling are met as fully as they can be, without unduly impinging an effective crime control, by the special requirements imposed on peace
officers who must make arrests in a house or apartment.
An affirmative answer to all of the following questions means the arrest is lawful:
(1) Is the offence in question indictable?
(2) Has the person who is the subject of arrest committed the offence or does the peace officer believe on reasonable and probable grounds that that person has committed or is about to
commit the offence in question?
(3) Are there reasonable and probable grounds for belief that the person sought is within the premises?
(4) Was proper announcement made before entry? This case arose before the Charter was in effect.
Furthermore, no determination was made on the nature and scope of the spatial limits of arrest without warrant under any section or subsection other than s. 450(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.”
R. v. Landry,  1 SCR 145
“The submission that a person who is by s. 450 of the Criminal Code authorized to make an arrest is, by s. 25, authorized by law to commit a trespass with or without force in the accomplishment of that arrest, provided he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, was not accepted.
Section 25 merely affords justification to a person for doing what he is required or authorized by law to do in the administration or enforcement of the law, if he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, and for using necessary force for that purpose. The question was whether the respondents were required or authorized by law to commit a [Page 740] trespass, not whether they were required or authorized to make an arrest. If they were authorized by law to commit a trespass, the authority for it must be found in the common law for there is nothing in the Criminal Code.
Unlike civil process, in the execution of criminal process the test is whether there are reasonable and probable grounds for acting. If the police officer has reasonable and probable cause to believe that the person named in the warrant for arrest is in the home of a stranger he has the right, after proper demand, to enter the home forcibly, to search and to arrest. In the present case the police officers had reasonable and probable grounds for believing that C was in the appellant’s apartment.
Except in exigent circumstances, the police officers must make an announcement prior to entry. In the ordinary case, before forcing entry, they should give (i) notice of presence by knocking or ringing
the doorbell, (ii) notice of authority, by identifying themselves as law enforcement officers and (iii) notice of purpose, by stating a lawful reason for entry.” Eccles v. Bourque et al.,  2 SCR 739
FACT: Corey Peeace and his family endured unlawful Calgary police entries of their residence on 3 separate occasions within as many years prior to his killing in June 2011.
FACT: Officer Cook, Corey’s killer, was the subject of a complaint and litigation Corey initiated in respect of an unlawful entry, assault and unlawful arrest on February 2010 when Cook trespassed, assaulted, handcuffed & tasered Corey while he was sleeping in bed.
FACT: Chief Hanson, Officer Cook, Gary Creasser & Cliff Purvis each appear to have unclean hands not only in respect of appearing to each be parties to Corey’s killing, but also in respect of what appears to be obstruction, conspiracy and cover-up.